5 More recent developments

Recent years have shown a tendency to reinterpret the body of EPR’s paper as a proof of m-incompleteness. The sharp contrast between the ’believe’ in the last paragraph and the science in the body of the paper had to be hidden somehow. The paper was so to say ’rewritten’ as a hidden variable theory, ’elements of reality’ became hidden variables. However, the real EPR paper is not a hidden variable theory but the construction of an internal contradiction within the CI. It is certainly true that EPR’s conclusion implies the possibility of a more complete description. However they have not shown that such a more complete description exists. The only way to do this is to construct a ’better’ (hidden variable) theory for QT. Nothing like that can be found in EPR’s paper.

As a further development, which will be dealt with only briefly, the validity of EPR’s final conclusion has been discussed in conjunction with the validity of their basic assumptions. According to the late Einstein, EPR’s final conclusion may be rewritten as the statement that not both of the following two assertions (quoted literally from [8]) can be true:

  1. The description by means of the Psi-function is complete.
  2. The real states of spatially separated objects are independent from each other.

Today, the second assertion is frequently split into the assertions of ’locality’ and ’reality’ (see e.g. Wiseman [32]). Incompleteness with regard to predictions of individual events is a familiar feature. On the other hand a breakdown of ’locality’ or ’reality’ presents a much stronger and stranger assumption. Thus, the failure of the first assertion seems more natural. Therefrom Einstein’s conclusion that QT is ’incomplete’.

If Bell’s theorem is (erroneously) used to show that the first assertion is true, then the breakdown of at least one of the fundamental scientific principles of ’locality’ or ’reality’ is a necessary consequence. Thus, certain strange features associated with single events became a subject of intense research because they could now be described in terms of c.f. a ’breakdown of locality’. Thus the strange (’weird’, ’magical’) features of QT which always appear, whenever QT is used to describe single particles, became manifest once again, but this time in a supposedly more definite form thanks to Bell’s theorem.

If, on the other hand, the two different meanings of the term ’completeness’ are clearly distinguished from each other, then Bell’s proof of m-completeness cannot be used to eliminate QT’s property of p-incompleteness. Then, the above Einstein alternative leads to the same final conclusion as before, namely that an individuality interpretation of QT does not exist. This means that QT is a statistical theory (probably complete in a metaphysical sense, and certainly complete in a metaphysical sense as defined by Bell) which by its very nature cannot be used to describe the behavior of single particles. The ’strangeness’ of QT is nothing but the consequence of an unjustified extension of its range of validity. Typically, all the strange things never happen in the laboratory but always in the brain of the interpreter.